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The Conﬂict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to
model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that al-
lows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their
strategies. An individual’s best response strategy is thus deﬁned based on this projec-
tion, adding additional stability conditions to strategic choice and increasing the set
of potential equilibria beyond pure Nash equilibria. Yet, the original Conﬂict Analy-
sis approach lacks the ability to genuinely model dynamic repeated games, in which
past play deﬁnes the condition for future interactions. This article will illustrate how
the original model can be adapted to include endogenous individual preferences that
are deﬁned by the strategic choice of players during past play, allowing to model the
reciprocal connection between preferential change and best response play in repeated
games. A dummy game serves as an exemplar and helps to visualise the results ob-
tained from this extension.
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Conﬂict Analysis is an alternative approach that assumes the capacity of players to ex-
trapolate the reactions of other players to their strategic choices. The sequential reasoning
renders it interesting for the analysis and modelisation of repeated games. Ille (2012) has
illustrated and critically analysed the underlying assumptions, and obtained results by fo-
cusing on a static analysis. In the context of repeated games, the approach presented so
far is insufﬁcient to effectively model the dynamics of strategic choice over a sequence of
interactions. This article concentrates on the dynamic analysis of games and expands the
initial attempt of (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, Ch. 14).
1.1. The Solution Algorithm
The basic assumptions of the Conﬂict Analysis approach are brieﬂy reviewed in the follow-
ing. For a more detailed explanation refer to Ille (2012). Given an n-person non-cooperative
game deﬁned by G = (S1,S2,...,Sn;U1,U2,...,Un), with player set N = (1,2,3,...,n), and Si
being individual i’s strategy set and S = ×Si being the set of strategy proﬁles. Let there be
an individual preference function Ui for each i ∈ N that ranks the strategy proﬁles accord-
ing to the individual’s preferences over the associated outcomes by assigning all strategy
proﬁles s = (s1,s2,...,sn) ∈ S to one of two subsets with respect to any underlying strategy
proﬁle q = (si,s−i).1
p ∈U+
i (q), iff O(p) ≻i O(q)
p ∈U−




i (q) = / 0 and U+
i (q)∪U−
i (q) = S„ and O(q) the outcome associated to q.
Denote a strategy proﬁles that can be obtained by a unilateral strategy switch, i.e. a switch
of player i given the strategies of all players other than i, by zi(q)=(si,s−i), with any si ∈Si.
Given the set Zi(q) of all strategy proﬁles that can be obtained by a unilateral switch of i,
the set of “dominant proﬁles” for q is then deﬁned as
DP: u+
i (q) = Zi(q)∩U+
i (q),∀si ∈ Si (2)
In other words, a dominant proﬁle with respect to q is deﬁned by the strategy proﬁle of a
unilateral switch of player i to a better response strategy given strategies s−i of all players
other than i.
1Preferences are assumed to be complete and transitive, though the last assumption is not strictly necessary
for the approach, see agin Ille (2012) for details.
2Two forms of stability of a player’s strategy choice can occur. If a better response
strategy is absent, a player is already playing his best response strategy and the underlying
strategy proﬁle is termed rationally stable for player i.
Rational Stability: u+
i (si,s−i) = / 0,∀si ∈ Si (3)
Furthermore, the switch to a better response strategy can entail a probable subsequent
switch of another player j to his better response strategy, given the new strategy proﬁle
after the switch of player i. This may lead to an outcome, not strictly preferred by player
i to the outcome deﬁned by the strategy proﬁle from which player i originally switched.
Thus, player i refrains from unilaterally choosing this better response strategy. In that case
the strategy switch is sequentially sanctioned and the strategy does not qualify as a viable
better response strategy. If all better response strategies are sequentially sanctioned, the
current strategy is best response and the underlying strategy proﬁle is termed sequentially
stable for player i. For any player j deﬁne ˆ u+
j (p) = Zj(p)∩U+
j (p) as the set of DPs for
player j to player i’s dominant proﬁle p for q,
Sequential stability: ˆ u+
j (p = (s∗
i ,s−i))∩U−
i (q = (si,s−i))  = / 0,
∀s∗
i : p = (s∗
i ,s−i) ∈ u+
i (q) and for any j  = i
(4)
If a strategy is neither rational nor sequential stable for player i, i.e. neither condition 3 nor
condition4hold, itisunstable.2 Deﬁnetheunderlyingstrategyproﬁleasunstableforplayer
i. A strategy proﬁle that consists only of components that are best response strategies, i.e.
a strategy proﬁle that is stable for all players, is considered stable, and deﬁnes the game’s
potential equilibrium. Whether the individual strategies in the proﬁle are sequentially or
rationally stable, is irrelevant. Notice, however, that only a strategy proﬁle, in which each
component is rationally stable, is a Nash equilibrium.
1.2. Representation
Since this approach goes beyond the Nash deﬁnition of an equilibrium by adding sequential
and simultaneous stability, a representation of a game in normal or extensive form is insuf-
ﬁcient. It is therefore necessary to spend a few words on the structure of analysis. Each
strategy can deﬁne a set of actions, such that an individual strategy consisting of r indepen-
dent actions is deﬁned as si = (a1i,a2i,...,ari). A player has the choice whether or not to
take a certain action. Deﬁne the set Aki =(aki,¬aki), so set Aki consists of two elements, the
ﬁrst meaning that action k is chosen by player i, the second that it is not. Whence we ob-
2Simultaneous stability is of no interest in this context, as this article will focus solely on repeated games
that are played sequentially.
3tain that Si ⊆ ×kAki, where the equality holds if none of the actions are mutually exclusive.
Hence, each strategy of a player i can be uniquely deﬁned by a binary vector of length equal
to the number of actions that player i possesses. Similarly, also each strategy proﬁle can be
uniquely identiﬁed by a binary vector equal in length to the sum of all available individual
actions. Each element in this vector deﬁnes an individual action and its value whether the
action is chosen or not.
Assume a game with three players, where the strategy set Si is deﬁned by the num-
ber of actions x = |
S
kAki|, strategy set Sj by the number of actions y = |
S
kAkj|, and
strategy Sh by the number of actions z = |
S
kAkh|, implying that the actions are mutu-
ally non-exclusive for player i, j and h, respectively.3 In such a three player game, each
strategy proﬁle q = (si,sj,sh) can be deﬁned by a binary vector of length x+y+z, given
by ˆ q = (





z z }| {
I,I,...,I)T. I denotes a binary value of either 0 or 1, where 1
implies that the action is chosen, 0 that it is not. Hence, each player individually deﬁnes
the sequence of this binary vector for a length equal to the number of available actions. As
an example, for a three player game, in which each player has two mutually non-exclusive
actions, one strategy proﬁle p is deﬁned by ˆ p = (0,1,1,0,1,0)
T. The length of this binary
vector can be reduced in the case of mutually exclusive actions. If an action A can only
be chosen, if an action B is not and the inverse, but one action has to be chosen, then both
action can be described by a single digit in the binary vector. I = 1 could be deﬁned as A is
chosen by a player i, and thus I = 0 would mean that B is chosen.
Each such binary vector can be again uniquely deﬁned by a decimal code, calculated




kaki)| digits (less the number of those
actions reduced by the aforementioned simpliﬁcation in the case of mutually exclusive ac-
tions) that have either the value 1 or 0. Like the binary code of a computer this can be
rewritten by taking the sum over the products of the digit times two to the power of the
position in the vector. Consequently, the example ˆ p = (0,1,1,0,1,0)
T can be written as
0∗20+1∗21+1∗22+0∗23+1∗24+0∗25 = 22 = ˙ p. The value of 22 does not represent
a preference, but is the short representation of a strategy proﬁle.





kAki|), reduced by the actions that are mutually exclusive, that can be transformed
into a natural number deﬁning a strategy proﬁle.
Given the assumptions, the preference function Ui orders the strategy proﬁles into the
preference vector according to the preferences of player i over the associated outcomes.
Since preferences are strictly ordinal, it sufﬁces to note down the natural numbers, identi-
fying each a strategy proﬁle, in a vector, where the position of the component indicates the
3|.| denotes the cardinality of a set, i.e. absolute number of elements in the set.
4preference. Starting with the most preferred, strategy proﬁles can be ordered from the left
mostposition to theright. Thisimpliesthatforstrict andtransitivepreferenceseachstrategy
proﬁle can have only one position in the preference vector and it is strictly preferred to all
strategy proﬁles noted further to the right, i.e. for O(q) ≻i O(p) →Ui = (..., ˙ q,..., ˙ p,...).
2. A ﬁctitious Game of Social Conﬂict
In the following I will apply the Conﬂict Analysis approach to a ﬁctitious game, in which
two groups with conﬂicting interests interact. The game will serve as an exemplar to il-
lustrate how the approach is able to model the interaction dynamics of a repeated game.
Beginning with the static analysis of the game that constitutes the basis of the dynamic
analysis, the approach is extended step by step to provide a more sophisticated description
and analysis of the underlying game. Focus will be placed on the dynamic representation.
Starting out with a constant time-homogeneous transition matrix, the matrix is changed as
suchthatitisabletomodelthetransitionsbetweenvariouspreferenceorders. Subsequently,
the model is transformed into a more realistic dynamic process, where each state deﬁnes
the interaction basis for the subsequent state, yet with an exogenously determined transition
between preference orders. In a last step, the preference orders are directly determined by
the strategy distribution of past play, thus previous states both deﬁne subsequent states and
the rate of transition between preference orders.
Assume a game with two groups of players CA and CB. Further assume that the behaviour
of the two conﬂicting parties can be described by the collective action of all players in each
group. This implies that we are not interested in individual decision and the subtle processes
inside a group but the aggregate joint action.4 The game is thus assumed to be sufﬁciently
deﬁned by Γ = (SAt,SBt;UAt,UBt), where Sit deﬁnes the strategy set and Uit the preference
order for player group i, given i = A,B, at time t. Suppose both groups have to repeatedly
renew a contract (e.g. on the relative monetary pay-off for the joint production of a good,
on working conditions or on laws governing the mutual co-existence). Assume that group
B is the proposing group that offers a contract and that group A has to decided whether or
not to accept. The model is general enough to be interpreted as an abstract representation
of a conﬂict on various social levels, ranging from an interaction between two classic social
classes (the working class vs. the capitalists) over the conﬂict inside a single company
(advisory board vs. board of directors) down to the individual level.
4Notice that this is not equivalent to modelling macroeconomic behaviour on the basis of a representative
agent. In this game, no assumptions on the individual preferences and actions exist, i.e. it is not supposed that
any action of the group necessarily coincides with individual strategy choice, similar to the negligence of neural
processes in the standard economic explanation of individual choices. The model does not start out in a micro
level to explain macro dynamics, but assumptions are made on the same level as the general results, thereby
evading problems of super- or sub-additivity.
5Suppose that A has only a very limited action set.5 It can choose whether or not to fulﬁl
B’s contract and whether or not to actively demand a change in the (social) contract (e.g.
by revolting or striking). B has a larger action set. First, B decides about the relative share
it offers, i.e. how much the contract should beneﬁt itself at the cost of A’s beneﬁt. For
simplicity consider this only as the choice between a non-exploitative and an exploitative
offer. Second, B considers, whether or not it demands the certiﬁcation of the terms of the
contract, so that group A is legally obliged to fulﬁl its part of the contract. Third and last, B
hastochoosewhetherornottothreatenwithdrasticadditionalsanctions, shouldAnotabide
to the terms of the contract, in order to pressure A to sign and fulﬁl the contract. Hence,
A can choose between 4 actions (considering that inaction is an action), and B between
6. Consequently, there exist 4 pure strategies for A and 8 pure strategies for B leading to
25 = 32 possible strategy proﬁles.
To fulﬁl the contract and to demand a change of the terms is mutually exclusive, as
is the inverse. Hence, both the action of fulﬁlling the contract and of not demanding a
change can be represented as a single action, as can be the contrary, resulting in 24 = 16
possible strategy proﬁles. For notational simplicity the strategy sets can be further reduced
by neglecting strategy proﬁles that are deﬁned by strictly dominated strategies.6 These are
the two strategies, in which B does not certify the terms of the contract, but threatens A
by sanctions (a literal incredible threat), namely (Exploitation, no Certiﬁcation, Sanction)
and (no Exploitation, no Certiﬁcation, Sanction). Furthermore, strategies that include the
provision of a non-exploitative share of beneﬁt to group A, after it did not accept the con-
tract, are also assumed strictly dominated. This reduces the whole strategy proﬁle set to 9
(=16-2-2-(4-1)).7 Each binary representation of a strategy proﬁle (where 1 implies that the
action is taken and 0 that it is not) in the strategy set can again be symbolised by a decimal
code (see table 1).
The strategy proﬁles with value 3 and 7 deﬁne non-exploitative outcomes, in which
both groups have an incentive to abide to a contract that does not advantage one group over
another. Strategy proﬁle 0, in contrast, implies the requirement of a contractual change as
none of the groups conforms to the terms of the initial contract.8
If there exists a bijective relation between strategy proﬁle and outcome, an individual’s
preference over all outcomes determines a unique preference order of the set of strategy
proﬁles. An outcome is, however, not only deﬁned by a strategy proﬁle, but depends on
5In order to simplify notation I will speak, in the following, of A or B, instead of group A or group B.
6Note, however, that this assumption requires that the strategies are strictly dominated under the assumption
of sequential reasoning.
7The last assumption of strict dominance excluded 22 strategy proﬁles, of which one has already been
excluded by the previous assumption.
80 can be interpreted for example as a period of social revolution or the complete renewal of labour contracts
in a company.
6Table 1. Strategy proﬁle Set
A’s actions:
Abide 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
B’s actions:
No Exploitation 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Certiﬁcation 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sanction 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Decimal code 0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
the external circumstances deﬁned by the rules of the game. Further, the preferential eval-
uation of an outcome is deﬁned by the history of play of the other players that can change
the bargaining power, the information and belief a player has (for example on the others
bargaining power) and also the evaluation of other players (other-regarding preferences).
Thus, assume that an outcome is also deﬁned by the relative bargaining power of a groups
and each utility/preference value is affected by the sympathy for the other player group.
Further suppose that these change exogenously in time. (This assumption is relaxed later in
section 3.2.)
According to the value that is assigned to these variables, the strategy proﬁle associated
to an outcome and its underlying utility will change in the course of play. So will the prefer-
ence order. It is unnecessary to explicitly model these variables and sufﬁcient to implicitly
incorporate them into the preference vector. Notice, however, that the decimal number does
not describe identical outcomes under different assumptions of sympathy and bargaining
power. A decimal number represents indeed identical strategy proﬁles, but outcomes are
deﬁned conditional on the value of bargaining power and sympathy. When sympathy of
one player group for another player group decreases, strategy proﬁles that assign relatively
higher utility to the latter will offer less utility to the former and rank lower in the preference
order. Bargaining power will affect the feasibility and stability of certain actions (e.g. the
effect of strikes or the threat of a sanction). A change in bargaining power will thus alter
the relative preference for a strategy proﬁle.9
For the ﬁrst case assume that initially A prefers above all those strategy proﬁles, in
which B offers a non-exploitative contract. It is indifferent between strategy proﬁle 7 and
3, and slightly dislikes the threat of sanctions. If B offers an exploitative contract and does
not certify the contract, A prefers not to abide to the terms of the contract. If the contract is
certiﬁed, A prefers the case of no sanction, since this implies lower costs in the case, where
9Arguably such a model leaves too much room for interpretation of exactly how a change in preference
order occurs. Yet, the abstract way, in which complex interactions are analysed, should leave that room of
interpretation.
7A breaks the agreement. In the second case, A knows that a non-exploitative contract is
no longer feasible, since B has appropriated sufﬁcient market power. As a consequence, A
loses sympathy for B, implying that A prefers a change of the contract (e.g. by pressure of
strike) above all and no certiﬁcation or threat of sanction.
The preference order ranks the strategy proﬁles according to the player’s preference
over the associated outcomes. The order is from left to right, placing the strategy proﬁle
that is associated to the most preferred outcome in the left most position. All strategy
proﬁles to the right are strictly less preferred, except if the proﬁles are connected by a bar,
indicating indifference. The preference order for A looks as in table 2 (grey implies that
these strategy proﬁles are considered infeasible). In the ﬁrst preference order, the outcomes
associated with 7 and 3 are equally preferred, and the outcome associated to 12 is least
preferred.
Table 2. Preference Vector I
Preference order of A
Start 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
End 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
Thepreference orderofBisseparated intothreedifferentcases. LikeforA, theﬁrstcase
represents the initial situation of the model. B prefers to offer a non-exploitative contract.
Certifyingthecontractbeforehandisslightlypreferredtojustprovidingthenon-exploitative
share to A without contractual certiﬁcation. The threat of sanctioning A is even less pre-
ferred, since B considers this unnecessary if A approves the contract (both groups are aware
of their mutual benevolence). The second case is the situation, in which B gained in relative
bargaining power. B believes that not fulﬁlling the contract by A will have no fundamental
repercussions, e.g. that A reacts only with a limited violent aggression and the effect of
strike is negligible. B also believes that an a priori threat of sanction will push A to abide to
the terms of the contract and will limit the violence of A’s reaction. Hence, B prefers above
all to exploit A and always to threaten with a sanction to only certifying, which is again
preferred to not certifying. B prefers 12 to 15, since the possible loss from non-fulﬁlment is
expected to be lower than the expected loss from offering a non-exploitative contract. Since
B has an interest to maintain his status quo power, strategy proﬁle 0 is least preferred. In
the third stage, B is aware that A has no sympathy for B. If A does not abide to the contract,
the subsequent reaction (i.e. a violent general strike or a social revolution) will question
and endanger B’s status quo position, since A is likely to win the conﬂict. Therefore B
prefers all those strategy proﬁles, in which A fulﬁls the contract, and desires most those, in
which A is still exploited. In the case, where A does not intend to abide to the terms of the
contract, no certiﬁcation is preferred to just certifying, which is again preferred to threaten
8with sanctions. The idea is that B fears that the violence of A’s reaction will depend on how
much B abused his bargaining power.10 Consequently B’s preference order is assumed as
illustrated in table 3.
Table 3. Preference Vector II
Preference order of B
Start 7 3 15 5 1 13 12 4 0
Intermediate 13 5 1 12 15 7 3 4 0
End 13 5 1 15 7 3 0 4 12
2.1. Stability Analysis without Mis-perception
It is required to carry out a static analysis of the game before proceeding to a dynamic rep-
resentation. Based on the given assumptions, 4 different games can be derived for the static
model. The ﬁrst is the case, in which both parties have preferences given by “start”. The
second is deﬁned by A’s preference order in “start” and B’s preference order as in “interme-
diate”. This implies a situation, in which B has sufﬁcient bargaining power to exploit, but A
has insufﬁcient power to successfully demand a change of the contract. Similarly, the next
two stages are then given by preferences “end-intermediate” and “end-end”. The solution of
every static game is represented for efﬁciency in the tabular form (for a detailed description
of the derivation of this form, refer to Ille, 2012; Fraser and Hipel, 1984). The stabilities
are indicated for both player groups with u - unstable, r - rationally, s - sequentially stable.
These stabilities are derived according to conditions 3 and 4 and all those proﬁles, which
are stable for both groups, deﬁne an equilibrium of the game. The ﬁrst static game and its
analysis are given in table 4 below.
The DPs are derived as described from condition 2. The DPs below a certain strategy
proﬁle are vertically ordered according to their position in the preference vector, i.e. the
highest DP is most preferred by this player group. Strategy proﬁles lacking a DP are ratio-
nally stable according to condition 3. A change from 1 to 0 of A, i.e. a switch from strategy
Abide to not Abide given B’s strategy Exploitation, no Certiﬁcation, no Sanction, entails a
subsequent shift of B to 12 or 4. Both are less preferred than the outcome associated to the
original strategy proﬁle 1. Condition 4 is fulﬁlled for 1 and player A. A shift of A from 4
to 5 causes a subsequent shift of B to 7, 3 or 15, of which all rank higher in the preference
order. Neither condition 3 nor 4 are satisﬁed for 4. In the same fashion the remaining sta-
bilities are calculated for A and B. In the ﬁrst static game only strategy proﬁle 7=(Abide;
10A non-violent change of the contract is preferred to an act of violence that will cause additional costs for
B.
9Table 4. First static game
start-start
overall stability E x x x x x x x x
stability for A r r r r s r u r u
A’s preference order 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
DPs 0 5 13
stability for B r u u u u u r u u
B’s preference order 7 3 15 5 1 13 12 4 0
DPs 7 7 7 7 7 12 12




no Exploitation,Certiﬁcation) is stable for both groups. Hence, the contract is deﬁned by a
fair cooperation. The solution to the second static game is shown in table 5.
Table 5. Second static game
start-intermediate
overall stability x x x x x x x E x
stability for A r r r r s r s r u
A’s preference order 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
DPs 0 5 13
stability for B r u u r u u u u u
B’s preference order 13 5 1 12 15 7 3 4 0
DPs 13 13 13 13 13 12 12




The stable equilibrium of the second game in table 5 is deﬁned by 13=(Abide; Exploita-
tion, Certiﬁcation, Sanction). Table 6 describes the third static game, in which A prefers a
social change to the status quo situation, but B believes to have sufﬁcient bargaining power
to prevent such a change.11 The equilibrium of the third game in table 6 is deﬁned by
12=(Not Abide; Exploitation, Certiﬁcation, Sanction). A asks for a social change, but B is
unwilling to give up his status quo position. The last game, in which the probability of a
successful social change is high, is depicted in table 7.
11In the game context, this period could be interpreted as an attempt of social turnover.
10Table 6. Third static game
end-intermediate
overall stability x x E x x x
stability for A r r r u u u
A’s preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
DPs 0 4 12
stability for B r s s r u u u u u
B’s preference order 13 5 1 12 15 7 3 4 0
DPs 13 13 13 13 13 12 12




Table 7. Fourth static game
end-end
overall stability E E x x x x x
stability for A r r r u u u
A’s preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
DPs 0 4 12
stability for B r s s s u u r u u
B’s preference order 13 5 1 15 7 3 0 4 12
DPs 13 13 13 13 13 0 0




The equilibrium is deﬁned by 0=(Not Abide; Exploitation) or 15=(Abide, No Exploita-
tion, Certiﬁcation, Sanction). The former is the situation, in which A and B do not reach a
mutual consent regarding their contract. The second deﬁnes a situation similar to the previ-
ous game in table 6, but B prefers to offer a non-exploitative contract fearing the eventual
repercussion. Based on the original interpretation of the game, the strategy proﬁle sym-
bolised by 0 is regarded as a period, during which the social or work contract is rewritten.
Since A deems 15 infeasible, it will not choose action Abide. The static model describes a
player population moving through the following states: (7 → 13 → 12 → 0).
112.2. Hypergames
A hypergame occurs, whenever some player j is wrong about the true nature of game
G and perceives a game that either or both differs with respect to the actual preference
order or to the available strategies in the sets S−j of the other players. Deﬁne player
i’s strategy set and preference order by the vector Vi = {Si,Ui}. A non-cooperative n-
player game can be represented by G = (V1,V2,..,Vn). If one or more players misper-
ceive the underlying rules, game G for player j is given by Gj = (V1j,V2j,..,Vnj) and
hence, a ﬁrst level hypergame is deﬁned as H = (G1,G2,...,Gn). If other players are
aware of the faulty perception of player j, the game turns into a second level hyper-
game, where the game for player j is deﬁned by an individual ﬁrst level hypergame
Hq = (G1q,G2q,...,Gnq). Consequently the second level hypergame is represented by
H2 = (H1,H2,...,Hn). The reasoning can be continued for higher level hypergames. A
third level hypergame would occur in the case, where some player erroneously perceive
another players misperception, which is again recognised by other players. The third level
hypergame will be represented by H3 = (H2
1,H2
2,...,H2
n). In the case of two players with
i = A,B a ﬁrst level hypergame is characterised by H = (GA,GB). A third level hypergame










(GAAA GBAA) (GABA GBBA)
(GAAB GBAB) (GABB GBBB)
)
.
The equilibria of a ﬁrst level hypergame depend on the stability of each player’s strate-
gies within their individual games. The set of equilibria is deﬁned by those strategy proﬁles
that are stable according the the individual perception given by the individual stabilities in
H = (GA,GB), i.e. by the strategy proﬁles stable both inVAA and VBB.
Before developing the dynamic representation, the following short subsection will con-
sider a ﬁrst level hypergame. This will be of interest, when the dynamic representation
with state dependent transition probabilities will be developed. In comparison with the re-
sults obtained here, the state dependent approach can dynamically model hypergames.12
Suppose that B overestimates the benevolence of A and its general willingness to accept
any contract. On the other hand, A wrongly estimates B’s bargaining power and intentions.
Both groups believe to be playing entirely different games (see table 8), illustrating the sit-
uation, in which B believes to be still playing “start-start”, and A to be playing “end-end”.
The stabilities for the individual strategy proﬁles in the two games can be directly taken
from the tables 4 and 7, and are stated again in the upper half of table 8 for simplicity.
The equilibria of this hypergame are given by the stabilities of each group according to its
individual game. This is represented in the lower part of the table. Consequently, in this
12This refers also to an n-level hypergame, since, as illustrated in Article 4, a hypergame of any level can be
represented by a ﬁrst level hypergame.
12case the strategy proﬁle would be either 7 or 12, unlike only 7 or 0 as expected by B or by
A, respectively. If A assumes 3, 7, and 15 infeasible and will not choose action Abide, the
ﬁnal and only equilibrium of the game is deﬁned by 12.
Table 8. First Level Hypergame: Mutual Mis-perception of the Game
“end-end” - A’s perception
stability for A r r r u u u
A’s preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
stability for B r s s s u u r u u
B’s preference order 13 5 1 15 7 3 0 4 12
“start-start” - B’s perception
stability for A r r r r s r ˆ u r u
A’s preference order 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
stability for B r u u u u u r u u
B’s preference order 7 3 15 5 1 13 12 4 0
Combining A’s and B’s Stability
overall stability E x x E x x x
stability for A r r r u u u
As preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
stability for B r u u u u u r u u
B’s preference order 7 3 15 5 1 13 12 4 0
2.3. Dynamic representation
Though the analysis of the game in its static form already indicates the possible equilibria
that might occur during various stages of interaction, a dynamic representation, which can
be controlled to continuously move between the various preference orders, is preferable.
As a ﬁrst step, the individual transition matrix for each group must be derived on the basis
of the static analysis. The individual transition matrices will be used to form the transition
matrix T for the entire game. A deﬁnition of the individual transition matrices, solely on the
basis of the initial (start-start) and the ﬁnal (end-end) game, should sufﬁce as an example.
For a games with f strategy proﬁles, let a state Xt be deﬁned by the probability distri-
bution of the strategy proﬁles in time t with dimension f ×1, i.e. by a vector, where each
component indicates the likelihood of a strategy proﬁle at time t over the entire set S. The
Markov process is determined by
Xt = T Xt−1, (5)
13and T is the transition matrix of dimension f × f that describes the transition probability
of moving from strategy proﬁle x in period t −1 to y in t. Under the condition that the
transition matrix T is time homogeneous the Markov process is deﬁned by Xt = Tt X0. Two
variants can be used as a basis to model preferential change:
Variant 1: As a ﬁrst assumption, consider that players exogenously change their ex-
pectations about the game they are playing. Since each individual transition matrix should
reﬂect the preference order in both games, the original approach needs some adaptation.
Deﬁne a “transition probability” α and γ. The ﬁrst refers to the preference order of A, the
latter to preference order of B. Deﬁne the transition probability for A in such a way that
1−α gives the probability of being in a state deﬁned by game (start-start) and hence, α is
the probability of being in state deﬁned by game (end-end). A continuum of states, deﬁned
by a speciﬁc value of the transition probability, can be thus described, ranging from the
stabilities of A as in start, start (α = 0) to its stabilities as in end, end (α = 1). The transi-
tion probabilities hence enable us to shift between the preference orders of each group. The
transition matrix TA for group A is given in table 9.
Table 9. Individual Transition Matrix with identical Perception
Transition Matrix for A
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 1 α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1-α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 α 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1-α 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 α α 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-α 1-α 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Though derivation of this matrix is intuitive, it is useful to look at the original preference
order and the stabilities of tables 4 and 7, shown again in table 10. For simplicity, it is
Table 10. Comparison Initial & Final Stage
Preference order of A at the initial and ﬁnal stage
stability for A in initial stage r r r r s r u r u
As preference order 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
DPs 0 5 13
stability for A in ﬁnal stage r r r u u u
A’s preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
DPs 0 4 12
14generally assumed that a player switches to his most preferred non-sanctioned DP. In both
games, strategy proﬁles 0, 3, 4, 7, and 15 are stable. Hence, a value of 1 is written along the
main diagonal for these strategy proﬁles. Strategy proﬁle 1 is stable in the initial game, but
has a DP and therefore a transition to 0 in the ﬁnal game. Thus, with probability 1−α, A
remains in strategy proﬁle 1, with probability α it switches to strategy proﬁle 0. The same
logic provides the rest of the matrix for the remaining strategy proﬁles. In the same manner
the transition matrix TB in table 11 for B is derived, where γ gives the transition probability
from the initial preference order to the one in the ﬁnal state of the game. Hence, γ = 0
describes B’s stabilities in (start, start) and γ = 1 its stabilities in (end, end). Keep in mind
that a player can only switch to a non-sanctioned DP. The most preferred non-sanctioned
DP of B for 3 and 7 is 15.
Table 11. Individual Transition Matrix with identical Perception
Transition Matrix for B
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0
1 0 γ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0
7 0 1 - γ 1 - γ 0 1 - γ 1 - γ 0 1 - γ 1 - γ
12 1 - γ 0 0 1 - γ 0 0 1 - γ 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ 0
15 0 0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0 γ
Subsequently, these two matrices are combined into a single transition matrix T (see ta-
ble 12). The derivation of this matrix is more complicated than the derivation of the individ-
ualtransitionmatrices. BylookingatthetransitionmatrixforA, itcanbeseenthatAstaysat
Table 12. Final Transition Matrix
Combined Transition Matrix for the Game
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 γ γ α 0 γ α 0 0 α γ 0 0
1 0 (1-α) γ 0 (1-α) γ 0 0 (1-α) γ 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 α (1−γ) 0 0 α 0 0 α (1-γ) 0
5 0 0 0 0 (1-α) γ 0 0 0 0
7 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 1 - γ 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 1 - γ 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 1 - γ
12 1 - γ 0 0 α (1-γ) 0 0 α (1-γ) α γ 0
13 0 0 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 0 0 (1-α) (1-γ) (1-α) γ 0
15 0 0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0 γ
strategy proﬁle 0 with certainty. Therefore group A will choose (0,−,−,−)
T with probabil-
ity 1.13 B stays in 0 with probability γ and switches to 12 with probability 1-γ. Accordingly,
13Remember that the strategy proﬁle can also be written as a vector in binary code. Here A is only able to




the ﬁnal transition matrix are given by (0,0,0,0)
T with probability 1×γ, and (0,0,1,1)
T
with probability 1×(1−γ). Strategy proﬁle 12 stays with probability α in 12 and with
probability (1−α) switches to 13. Hence, A chooses to accept the contract with probabil-
ity (1−α) and not to with probability α. B changes to strategy proﬁle 0, i.e. it chooses
(−,0,0,0)
T, with probability γ, and stays in 12, deﬁned by (−,0,1,1)
T, with probability (1-
γ). Hence, strategy proﬁle 12 is followed by 0 with probability α×γ, by 1 with probability
(1 − α) × γ, by 12 with probability α × (1 − γ), and by 13 with probability
(1−α)×(1−γ). The calculation used to ﬁnd the equilibria in the joint transition matrix is





˙ oi−(x−1)˙ q, (6)
where ¯ q deﬁnes the value of the new equilibrium, x the number of player groups (here
x = 2), and ˙ oi the value of the DP of group i from strategy proﬁle q given by value ˙ q.
Some transitions would lead to strictly dominated strategy proﬁles, which have been
ruled out before. Equation 6 is thus inapplicable in these cases. Strategy proﬁle 1, for
example, is followed by strategy proﬁle (0,1,1,0)
T with probability α×(1−γ). Yet, this
strategy proﬁle is considered infeasible. There is, however, a logical solution. The rea-
son for ruling out strategy proﬁles (0,1,−,−)
T in the ﬁrst place, has been that if A does
not abide, a strategy including a non-exploitative contract was assumed strictly dominated.
Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that the group will cause the strategy proﬁle to switch to
(0,0,1,0)
T, namely 4. Therefore the probabilities are added to strategy proﬁle 4.14
The two games and the transition between them can be represented by an adapted ver-
sion of equation 5. Each state is determined by a unique transition matrix Tα,β; a variant of
the original transition matrix T, given the unique values of the transition probabilities α(t)
and γ(t) in each period t. Hence, a state in period t is deﬁned by Xt = Tt
α,βX0. Notice that
the transition probabilities disregard the probability a player assigns to certain strategies in
14Though contrary to the initial assumption, it can be argued that B responds to A.
In that case, strategy proﬁle 6 can be substituted by 7. The matrix then looks as:
Combined individual Transition Matrices of each group
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 γ α γ 0 γ α 0 0 α γ 0 0
1 0 (1-α) γ 0 (1-α) γ 0 0 (1-α) γ 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 α γ 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 (1-α) γ 0 0 0 0
7 0 (1-γ) 1 - γ 0 (1-γ) 1 - γ 0 (1-γ) 1 - γ
12 1 - γ 0 0 α (1-γ) 0 0 α (1-γ) α γ 0
13 0 0 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 0 0 (1-α) (1-γ) (1-α) γ 0
15 0 0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0 γ
Simulations results are similar to what is obtained from applying transition matrix 12.
16different states. Probabilities are only deﬁned by the composition of X0. Equilibrium 15 is
therefore observable, though it has been exogenously assigned zero probability in the anal-
ysis, presented in table 7. The vector X0, indicating the status quo, needs to be deﬁned a
priori for the simulation. Strategy proﬁle 0 is a reasonable assumption to describe a situa-
tion at the initial stage of interaction. No form of contract has yet been offered. The player
population could also be considered at a turning point. Hence X0 = (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
T.




T, implying society starting at strategy proﬁle 1 and 3 with
equal probability of 0.5.
Figure 1. Game with 2 Groups
The simulation was conducted for transition probabilities α(t) = γ(t) = t
100. Figure
1.A.) shows the probability of being in one of the nine possible strategy proﬁles fort ∈(0,5)
andt ∈(0,100). Table19onpage32providestheroundedprobabilitiesfromtheﬁrstperiod
to the last, in steps of ﬁve periods, in order to interpret the ﬁgure more easily. Though the
two “intermediate games” (i.e. start-intermediate and end-intermediate) were neglected,
the dynamic representation already shows a sequence that is alike to the static representa-
tion. The player population starts out at 0; a point, where initial bargaining begins. It goes
immediately to 12 and then to 13 and ﬁnally stays at 7 for a longer time. It takes three pe-
riods for our player population to reach the ﬁrst (initially stable) equilibrium. Both groups
reach a preliminary agreement on a non-exploitative contract. Strategy proﬁle 15 grows
steadily until the middle of the simulation, whereas 7 slowly diminishes. Strategy proﬁle
12 lags behind and obtains a low maximum probability of 11% in period 80 of the simula-
tion. Finally at the end of the cycle, the society returns to strategy proﬁle 0; a social change
or reform of the underlying contract.15 We thus obtain the sequence 7 → 15(→ 12) → 0.
Also notice that the dynamic representation includes ﬁrst level hypergames. The example
15Notice that the rise of 15 occurs through the shift of B to its most preferred unsanctioned DP. If it switches
from 15 to 13, the dynamics should exactly replicate the results of the static analysis.This assumption contra-
dicts, however, the requirement that a player never chooses a sanctioned DP.
17of section 3.2 can be obtained for setting α = 1 and γ = 0.
Table 13. Reduced Stability Analysis- only most preferred unsanctioned DP is shown
Preference order of A and B as in “start” P = (1−α)(1−β)
stability for A r r r r s r u r u
A preference order 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
DPs 5 13
stability for B r u u u u u r u u
B’s preference order 7 3 15 5 1 13 12 4 0
DPs 7 7 7 7 7 12 12
Preference order of A and B as in “end” P = αβ
stability for A r r r r r r u u u
A’s preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
DPs 0 4 12
stability for B r s s s u u r u u
B’s preference order 13 5 1 15 7 3 0 4 12
DPs 15 15 0 0
Pr. order of A as in “start” and B as in “end” P = (1−α)β
stability for A r r r r u r s r u
A’s preference order 7 3 15 0 1 5 4 13 12
DPs 0 5 13
stability for B r u u u u u r u u
B’s preference order 13 5 1 15 7 3 0 4 12
DPs 13 13 13 13 13 0 0
Pr. order of A as in “end” and B as in “start” P = α(1−β)
stability for A r r r r r r u u u
A’s preference order 3 7 15 0 4 12 1 5 13
DPs 0 4 12
stability for B r u u u u u r u u
B’s preference order 7 3 15 5 1 13 12 4 0
DPs 7 7 7 7 7 12 12
18Since a higher level hypergame can be simpliﬁed to a ﬁrst level hypergame as shown above,
the dynamic representation is able to incorporate all the properties developed for the static
game form. Evidently, in this case 7 and 12 are the only equilibria with value 1 on the main
diagonal.
Variant 2: The ﬁrst variant considered the case, in which players believe that the other
players in the game update their preference order in an identical way.16 Yet previous play,
information and expectation can have a different effect on the players’ preference orders.
As a consequence, players perceive that they shift independently their preference order. For
the given example, we thus obtain 4 different games, instead of 2; the same as before, but in
addition a game, in which A has preference order “start” and B has preference order “end”,
and a fourth that represents the inverted case. Table 13 on page 18 illustrates the stabilities
of these 4 games. Following the same logic as variant 1, the ﬁrst game with preference
order “start-start” occurs with probability (1−α)(1−β), the second deﬁned by “end-end”
with probability αβ, the third game deﬁned by “start-end” with probability (1−α)β, and
the fourth deﬁned by “end-start” with probability α(1−β).
Based on the transitions in table 13, the individual transition matrix for A has
the shape as in table 14. The transition probabilities are determined by the DPs
in table 13 and the corresponding probability of the game, e.g 0 stays at 0 in all
4 games and thus transition occurs to 0 with probability 1, strategy proﬁle 1 stays
in 1 only in the ﬁrst game but shifts to 0 in the remaining three, thus transition
occurs to 1 with probability (1 − α)(1 − β), and to 0 with probability 1 − (1 − α)
(1−β). In the same way the transition matrix for B is obtained and represented in table 15
Table 14. Individual Transition Matrix of A: correct perception
Transition Matrix for A
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 1 1-(1-α) (1-γ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1-(1-α) (1-γ) α 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 (1-α) (1-γ) (1-α) 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 α α 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-α 1-α 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
The ﬁnal transition matrix is obtain in the same way as before, i.e. by combining the two in-
dividual transition matrices. Again the transition to strategy proﬁle 6 can occur if equation 6
is applied to calculate the ﬁnal transitions. As in the earlier variant, the transition probabili-
tieshavebeenattributedtostrategyproﬁle4(seetable16). Asimulationasinvariant1, with
16e.g. if A has preferences as in start, it believes that B has also preferences as in start.
19α(t) = γ(t) = t
100, is shown in ﬁgure 1 B.) making it directly comparable to the results of
variant 1. Though the initial sequence is identical, as well as the most predominant strat-
egy proﬁles (i.e. 7 =violet and 0 =blue), transition occurs to 13 =green and 12 =brown
in the intermediate time periods. We obtain a transition that is akin to the static analysis
(7(→ 13) → 12 → 0 ).
Both variants suffer, however, from a decisive shortcoming. They model only a
“pseudo” dynamic process, since each state is independent of the previous states, and does
not add informational value to the static model, though the form of representation is more
efﬁcient. Each state Xt is deﬁned by Xt = Tt
α,βX0, i.e. a state in period t is solely determined
by the initial state of the world X0 and its unique transition matrix Tα,β. Hence, states only
differ in the variation of the transition matrix and its exponent. Although, this approach
allows to describe a transition between the individual static games and hypergames, and
offers the convenient determination of a state without the requirement to calculate previous
states, a true dynamic process is deﬁned by Xt = Tα,βXt−1. This deﬁnition implies that each
state deﬁnes the “playing ground”, i.e. probability distribution of strategy proﬁles, at the
beginning of the next interaction period, based on which players deﬁne their best response
strategies. Since each state has a unique transition matrix, which shapes the path between
states, it obviously holds that Tα,βXt−1  = Tt
α,βX0, as T is not time homogeneous.
The following analysis is independent of which variant is chosen, since each of the fol-
lowing extensions can be equivalently applied to any variant. Though variant 2 is more apt
to model most dynamic interactions, variant 1 offers a less demanding representation, ren-
dering it more accessible to the reader. Consequently, variant 1 is chosen for the subsequent
analysis.
Table 15. Individual Transition Matrix of B: correct perception
Transition Matrix for B
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0 γ 0 0
1 0 α γ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 α γ 0 0 0 0
7 0 1-γ 1-γ 0 1-γ 1-γ 0 1-γ 1-γ
12 1-γ 0 0 1-γ 0 0 1-γ 0 0
13 0 (1-α) γ (1-α) γ 0 (1-α) γ (1-α) γ 0 γ (1-α) γ
15 0 0 α γ 0 0 α γ 0 0 α γ
20Table 16. Game Transition Matrix: correct perception
Final Transition Matrix
0 1 3 4 5 7 12 13 15
0 γ (1-(1-α) (1-γ)) α γ 0 (1-(1-α) (1-γ)) γ 0 0 α γ 0 0
1 0 (1-α) (1-γ) (α γ) 0 (1-α) (1-γ) γ 0 0 (1-α) γ 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 (1-(1-α) (1-γ)) (1-γ) 0 0 α(α γ +(1-γ)) 0 0 α (1-γ) 0
5 0 0 0 0 (1-α) α γ 0 0 0 0
7 0 (1-α) (1-γ) (1-γ) 1-γ 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 1-γ 0 (1-α) (1-γ) 1-γ
12 1-γ (1-(1-α) (1-γ)) (1-α) γ 0 (1-(1-α) (1-γ)) (1-γ) α (1-α) γ 0 α (1-γ) α γ 0
13 0 (1-α) (1-γ) (1-α) γ (1-α) γ (1-α) (1-γ) (1-γ) (1-α) (1-α) γ (1-α) γ (1-α) (1-γ) (1-α) γ (1-α) γ
15 0 0 α γ 0 0 α γ 0 0 α γ
3. Interaction between three parties with endogenous prefer-
ences
This section will take account of the issue raised in the previous section, but will also add
some complexity to the underlying group structure. The Conﬂict Analysis approach has
modelled the interaction of two distinct groups. Since the approach is capable of modelling
a larger number of player groups, the following subsection will analyse a non-homogeneous
group, i.e. it is assumed that the group A consists of two sub-groups. One sub-group is still
deﬁned as A, the second sub-group is named C. In game Γ = (SAt,SBt,SCt;UAt,UBt,UCt),
both sub-groups, C and A, have the same relation towards B and decide, whether or not to
abide to the rules of the contract.
3.1. Non-homogeneous group members
Since there are now three interacting groups, the strategy proﬁle set increases correspond-
ingly with the added strategy set. Following the same logic in ruling out strictly dominated




− indicating any value 0 or 1, there are 15 possible strategy proﬁles presented in table 17.
The same reasoning for the preference order like in the previous section apply. The previous
decimal code for the strategy proﬁles is rewritten as:
original value→new value 0→0, 2 1→1, 3 3→7 4→8, 10 5→9, 11 7→15 12→24, 26 13→25, 27 15→31
Furthermore A and C are assumed, for simplicity, to have the same preference order
(since they have the same relation to B); the corresponding strategy proﬁles are only mir-
rored according to the affected group. Hence, for example strategy proﬁle 1 and 2 exchange
places in the preference order ofC with respect to A. Some additional assumptions are nec-
essary for the asymmetric strategy proﬁles, in which A and C choose a different strategy.
21Table 17. Strategy proﬁle Set
A’s options:
Abide 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
C’s options:
Abide 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
B’s options:
No Exploitation 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Certiﬁcation 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sanction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Decimal code 0 1 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 15 24 25 26 27 31
Generally assume that group A and C prefer to take identical decisions, and for the ﬁrst
preference order assume that both prefer to sign, but not being the only group exploited.
For the second preference order, suppose that both favour refusing an exploitative contract
at all costs. Hence, the preference order for the three groups can be written as in table
18 (since the focus lies on the dynamic representation, only games “start-start-start” and
“end-end-end” are of interest, thus B’s “intermediate” preference order is neglected).
Table 18. Preference Vectors
Preference order of A
Start 7 15 31 0 2 3 1 11 8 9 10 27 25 24 26
End 7 15 31 0 8 24 2 10 26 1 9 25 3 11 27
Preference order ofC
Start 7 15 31 0 1 3 2 11 8 10 9 27 26 24 25
End 7 15 31 0 8 24 1 9 25 2 10 26 3 11 27
Preference order of B
Start 15 7 31 11 3 27 9 10 1 2 25 26 24 8 0
End 27 11 3 31 15 7 9 10 1 2 25 26 0 8 24
The static solution, both of the initial game with the related preference or-
der “start-start-start” and the ﬁnal game with preference order “end-end-end” is
presented in the table 20 on page 33. The set of equilibria is deﬁned by
E = (1,2,15) for the former game, and by E = (0,31) for the latter game. All equilib-
ria are reasonable, but not equally likely. By using the same procedure as before and based
on the obtained stabilities, the individual transition matrices can be derived as presented in
table 21 on page 34. Combining the three individual transition matrices results in the ﬁnal
transition matrix T in table 22 on page 35.
The structure of this matrix provides interesting information about the dynamics of the
underlying game. None of the strategy proﬁles is an absorbing state for all values of α, β,
22and γ. Notice that the number of potential equilibria exceeds the ﬁve equilibria that have
already been determined in the static analysis. The original ﬁve equilibria are, however,
deﬁned by the transition probability of a single group.17 The additional potential equilibria
can only be stable if two or more groups jointly show the necessary transition probability. If
it is assumed that group A and C have similar interests and, hence, approximately the same
values for their transition probabilities, the additional equilibria are deﬁned by 3,11,24,27.
Runningthemodelunderthesameconditionsasbefore, yieldstheexpectedresults. Yet,
owingto theissuethathas beenraised inthe previous subsectionthe simulationwilltakeac-
count of the path dependency of each state, i.e. Xt = TωXt−1 (where Tω is the short notation
for Tα,β,γ). Since this requires the calculation of each state, I programmed a loop in Mathe-
matica that iterates the calculation process in each period. In addition, I assumed that tran-
sition probabilities do not change at the same rate for all groups. For the example, the tran-













+0.5.18 The simulation was run for 800 periods. The distribution
of the strategy proﬁles from t = 0 to t = 800 are presented in ﬁgure 2 A.) (values are given
in table 23 on page 36) and transition probabilities are illustrated below in 2.B.).19
Figure 2. Game with 3 Groups:A.) shows the distribution for each state in t ∈ (0,800); B.)
shows the corresponding values for α(t) (blue), β(t) (red), and γ(t) (green).
17Group A determines the stability of 1, groupC the stability of 2, and group B the stability of 0, 15 and 31.
18I have not chosen a nested simulation with linearly increasing and decreasing transition probabilities, since
Mathematica showed problems with nested function. A simulation of the form α(t): α(t)= t
n fort ∈(0,100)∪
(200,300)∪(400,500) and α(t) = 1− t
n for t ∈ (100,200)∪(300,400)∪(500,600), where n is the upper
bound of the corresponding interval was therefore impossible.
19This and all following ﬁgures use the same colour code: 0- Blue,1- LightBrown, 2-Brown, 3- LightOrange,
7-Yellow, 8-Gray, 9-Cyan, 10-Magenta, 11-LightCyan, 15-Red, 24-Green, 25-Pink, 26-Purple, 27-Black, 31-
Orange
23The non-homogeneous model shows periods of cooperation, exploitation and conﬂict;
represented by the simpliﬁed sequence of predominant proﬁles: 15(red) → 24(green) →
0(blue) → 2(brown) → 15(red) → 24(green) → 0(blue) → 24(green) → 25(pink) →
9(cyan) → 15(red). This sequence shows that the group, which has a longer cycle (i.e.
groupC), accepts the offered contract more quickly and is more prone to exploitation in the
initial periods. Yet, the validity of these results is impaired by the exogenous and entirely
arbitrary deﬁnition of the transition probabilities, which do not exhibit any underlying de-
pendencies. A model that allows for more signiﬁcant results, requires to endogenise the
transition variable. Hence assume that individuals update their preference order based on
their experience, when interacting with other players. The strategies, which have been
played in previous encounters, will directly affect other-regarding preferences and the bar-
gaining power in future interactions.
3.2. State Dependent Transition Probabilities
This section will thus address the issue of endogenising the state dependent individual pref-
erence order. Until this point the transition probabilities have not been affected by the out-
comes of previous play, but have been deﬁned by an arbitrary relation. Yet, past play will
actively inﬂuence a player’s affections towards another player and the success and the gain
from previous play will also determine future bargaining power. An approach that takes
account of the effect of past play on the current preference order of a player, is to deﬁne a
direct relation between the frequency, with which strategy proﬁles occur, and the transition
probability values.20 For the given case of two different preference orders for an individual
group, a higher value of the transition probability illustrates that this group tends towards
the second preference order. Lower transition probabilities refer to the ﬁrst preference or-
der. Thus, the value of each individual transition probability can be assumed to increase
in the case, where strategy proﬁles, which support the conditions underlying the second
preference vector of this group/player, occur with higher probability and frequency. On
the contrary, transition probability decreases if strategy proﬁles, which are likely to “shift”
individual preferences towards the ﬁrst preference order, are played with higher probability
in the current play and appear more often.
20Notice, however, that there lies an issue here. Strategy proﬁles determine outcomes based on the current
state, i.e. if the transition probability is high, the outcome that a player associates to a strategy proﬁle is different
from the one, he associates in the case of a low transition probability. Hence, on the one hand, the effect of
a strategy proﬁle on the transition probability will be determined by the current state. On the other hand, the
relative frequency of the strategy proﬁle deﬁnes the state. We therefore obtain a circular relation. I will neglect
this issue here, since I believe it to be only of minor importance. The strategy proﬁles that either raise or lower
the probability are simply expected to do so under every state. A non-exploitative contract will generally lead
to A’s and C’s preferences as in “start-start-start”. Similarly an exploitative contract with a threat of sanction
will generally have the opposite effect.
24Assume a ﬁnite number of f different strategy proﬁles, so that for ˜ sk ∈ S, with
k = 1,..., f, a state Xt is deﬁned by a vector Xt = (x1(t),x2(t),...,xf(t)), with
∑
f
i=1xi(t) = 1, where each xk(t) deﬁnes the probability, with which strategy proﬁle ˜ sk oc-
curs in t. A transition probability ϕ(t), with ϕ(t) = α(t),β(t),γ(t), can be represented as a
function of Xt. Following the previous line of argument, deﬁne a set of strategy proﬁles O+
ϕ,
which consists of all the strategy proﬁles that increase the transition probability ϕ, since
these are expected to lead to preferences as described in the later preference order. Deﬁne
further another set O−
ϕ, which consists of all the strategy proﬁles that diminish the value of
ϕ, as they induce an individual preference according to the ﬁrst preference order, imply-
ing O+
ϕ ∩O−
ϕ = / 0 and O+
ϕ ∪O−
ϕ ⊆ S. Hence, each individual transition probability can be
represented as:







ϕ(t) is bound to ϕ(t) ∈ (0,1), and ˜ sj ∈ O+
ϕ and ˜ sh ∈ O−
ϕ
(7)
so that ∑xj(t −1)+∑xh(t −1) ≤ 1. ε+
ϕ and ε−
ϕ can be constant or stochastic variables that
deﬁne the impact of the relative occurrences of a strategy proﬁles on the transitional change.
The game with three groups will again serve as an example.
The assumptions on how to deﬁne the sets O+
ϕ and O−
ϕ for each transition probability
are manifold and so are the resulting dynamics. The following results are only meant as an
illustrative example for the approach. The deﬁnition of O+
ϕ and O−
ϕ are, however, chosen
in a plausible way with respect to the context of the game. Remember that the transition
probability of A is given by α(t), those of C by β(t) and those of B by γ(t). For simplicity
assume as before that A and C have symmetric preferences. Consequently, sets O+
α and
O+
β , as well as sets O−
α and O−
β will have a similar structure. They will only differ in those
strategy proﬁles, in which the strategic choices of both groups are different. In such cases
the strategy proﬁles are deﬁned by the mirror image of the corresponding proﬁle for the
other group (e.g. the strategy proﬁle denoted by 9=(1,0,0,1,0)T in O+
α corresponds to the
strategy proﬁle denoted by 10 = (0,1,0,1,0)T in O+
β ).
Assume that the sympathy for B is reduced in the case, where exploitative and certiﬁed
contracts occur with higher probability. In the case, where the exploitative contract is not
certiﬁed, A and C are not legally required to stick to their initial commitment, and these
contracts will thus have no effect on the transition probability. An increase in sympathy
for B arises only for non-exploitative contracts, where both groups accept or refuse21, and
where B does not threaten with a sanction in the case of rejection.
The bargaining power of group B is weakened in all those cases, in which both A and
21Collective rejection is considered as the requirement for re-negotiating the current contract.
25C refuse the contract, or in which one group refuses, though B has threatened to sanc-
tion the group that does not accept. In these cases, B realises that a sanction is no ef-
fective intimidation, thus re-evaluating its bargaining power. Congruently, the bargain-
ing power of B increases in those situation, in which A and C accept the offered con-
tract under any terms. Following this reasoning, the sets are deﬁned as follows: O+
α =
(9,11,25,27), O−
α = (0,7,8,15) = O−
β , O+
β = (10,11,26,27), O+
γ = (3,7,11,15,27,31),
and O−
γ = (0,8,24,25,26). Assume that ε−
ϕ and ε+
ϕ are equal to 0.2, which implies that
a complete transition from one preference order to the other requires at least 5 interaction
periods. Again letting Mathematica simulate the game for 200 periods, shows the result as
given in ﬁgure 3
Figure 3. Dynamic Representation of Game with 3 Groups - constant ε− and ε+
The game is cyclic after about 10 periods. Non-exploitative contracts
15 = (1,1,1,1,0)T (red) occur at approximately 10-40%, exploitative contracts with sanc-
tions is accepted, 27 = (1,1,0,1,1)T (black), with approximately 5-25% and refused, 24 =
(0,0,0,1,1)T (green), with approximately 10-20% and no contracting, 0 = (0,0,0,0,0)T
(blue), appears with approximately 0-12%.
The regularity, with which these strategy proﬁles occur does not represent a realistic
image of what we would expect the game to look like. The issue here is the constant
impact that strategy proﬁles / outcomes, have on the transition probability, as well as the
strict symmetry between group A and C. All three groups represent a larger number of
players. Since some players will react more violently to certain outcomes than others,
idiosyncratic reactions will add noise to the effect of outcomes on the preference order. A
similar argument holds for the assumption of strict symmetry between both groups. The
following simulation, however, only concentrates on the ﬁrst aspect. Both ε−
ϕ and ε+
ϕ are
assumed to be continuous and uniformly distributed over 0 to 0.2 for all groups, thus having
26half the same expected value as in the previous simulation. With the addition of added noise
in ε−
ϕ and ε+
ϕ, the simulation has been conducted in the same way as before. The result in
ﬁgure 4 shows a fairly different and more intuitive result, but the general dynamics are
maintained.
Figure 4. Dynamic Representation of Game with 3 Groups - ε−
ϕ,ε+
ϕ ∈ (0,0.2): A.) Simu-
lation for 3000 periods, showing only predominant strategy proﬁles, B.) three dimensional
representation- strategy proﬁles are ordered according to their relative decimal code (from
1 to 15), C.) detailed view of period 2400-2700 with all strategy proﬁles
Figure A.) illustrates the simulation for 3000 periods. Since most strategy proﬁles only
occur with very low frequency (on the average below 5%), I have reduced the presentation
to the predominant strategy proﬁles in ﬁgure 3, namely 0 (blue), 15 (red), 24 (green), and
27 (black). Non-exploitative contracts still occur with highest probability. In the stochastic
case the exploitative contract with sanction is on average more often rejected (represented
by the green line) than accepted (represented by the black line). The relative frequencies of
all strategy proﬁles is better visualised in ﬁgure B.). The axis labelled s shows the strategy
proﬁles, as they are simply ranked according to their position in the transition matrix T.22
Notice that the colours do not correspond with ﬁgure A.). The “combs” at position 1,
10,11,14, refer to strategy proﬁle 0,15,24 and 27, respectively. The highest elevation is at
22Position/Strategy Proﬁle: 1/0, 2/1, 3/2, 4/3, 5/7, 6/8, 7/9, 8/10, 9/11, 10/15, 11/24, 12/25, 13/26, 14/27,
15/31
27the blue ridge (15).
The simulation generated a sequence of periods, in which the exploitative contract has
been frequently refused by both A and C, though B has threatened with a sanction (see
Figure C.) ). Although it seems that a direct correlation between 15 (black) and 24 (green)
exists, a look at the transition matrix 22 on page 35 shows that this is not the case. Notice
that 25 (pink) and 26(purple) occur more frequent. Looking at the transition matrix 22 on
page 35 shows that there are two large blocks of highly connected strategy proﬁles. The
ﬁrst block is deﬁned by 9, 10, 11, 15, the second by 24, 25, 26. The second block is directly
connected to the ﬁrst by 27 and the ﬁrst to the second by 8. Consequently during this period,
the game switched from the ﬁrst to the second block of highly correlated strategy proﬁles.
This switch has occurred through a rise in all transition probabilities leading the system to
8 and 0. Both strategy proﬁles are an elements of O−
γ . Hence, the subsequent slump in γ
pushed the system towards 24. Due to high values of α and β and zero value of γ the system
kept high probability values for this strategy proﬁle, thus creating the short period of “social
discontentment”.
The values for ε+
ϕ and ε−
ϕ, and the composition of the sets O+
ϕ and O−
ϕ leave much
room for further analysis. Different values of ε+
ϕ and ε−
ϕ for the transition values change
the dynamics.23 Different strategy proﬁles can be expected to have a different degree of
impact. This can be done by splitting O+
ϕ and O−
ϕ into various disjoint subsets, and by
assigning to each subset a different value of ε+
ϕ and ε−
ϕ. In addition, the robustness of the
results can be tested for changes in the composition of O
+/−
ϕ . The strategy proﬁles, played
in each period, can also be the outcome of a sequence of negotiations. This can be simply
included by deﬁning Xt = (Tα,β)rXt−1, where the exponent r simply deﬁnes the number of
plays that determine the strategy outcome in a given period, i.e. the number of interactions
until a conclusion is reached.24 In short, there are many directions, in which the approach
presented in this article can be adapted to various purposes and requirements. Since these
changes constitute only a variation of equation 7, they will not be discussed in the scope of
this article.
23It can be observed, for example, that a group, which exhibits a relatively low impact of the strategy proﬁles
on the transition probabilities, is more prone to exploitation than the other group.
24Think of r as the time span of a conference or congress, that determines a treaty or contract for the future
period, such as a climate summit or plant bargaining.
284. Possible Extension and Conclusion
4.1. Ideas for an Agent-based model
As Potts (2000) illustrated, it is more reasonable to model on the basis of what he called “a
non-integral framework”. We should take account of the incomplete links between agents,
incomplete knowledge and necessity to explore technologies and thus the endogeneity of
preferences, as equivalent internal constructs to the underlying technologies.
Technologies is synonymous with strategy sets in the context of game theory. An exten-
sion of the presented approach should thus include the following: Strategy sets as well as
preferences should be able to evolve over time as players interact. Furthermore, the form of
inter-group and intra-group links between players should have signiﬁcant impact on the dy-
namics of the entire system. Yet, if the effect of connections on the external level (between
players and between groups on various levels of aggregation) and on the internal level (in
form of changing preferences and strategy options) is accounted for, the model will be un-
solvable in closed form. In addition, heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents make
it inevitable to use non-arithmetic modelling techniques and complex systems. Weaken-
ing the assumption in the described way thus will make it necessary to model by means of
agent-based simulations.
In this context the model has been extended in the following way (working paper CEU
–Complex Systems– 2009): The model acts on a macro basis (network structure of inter-
actions between agents, groups and classes) and on a micro basis that evolves internally
to the individual agent (preferences and resources). Each agent is initially endowed with a
constrained set of actions, which evolves over time. They are primary unaware of the re-
sults caused by a speciﬁc action and also their possible combination into more sophisticated
strategies. Thus, new strategies are a function both of previous combinations of actions on
the basis of a currently existing action set, and of previous interactions and experiences with
other players. The strategy set evolves according to endogenous search heuristics, which
have the form of genetically evolving operators (Cross-Over, speciﬁcation, point mutation
- see for example Dosi et al., 1999, 2003; Fagiolo and Dosi, 2003).
Interactions takes place in pairs, matching is random. Strategies and counter-strategies
are played until an equilibrium is reached or cyclic behaviour occurs, providing only the
fall-back position to each player. With each interaction, a player is increasingly able to
associate his and his counterpart’s strategies with an outcome, and to form expectations
about the sequence of strategies that will be played. Hence, he becomes increasingly aware
of his and the other agents’ strategy sets (i.e. resources). Furthermore, preferences are
incomplete, but adaptive. The pay-off, an individual receives conditional on his chosen
strategy, affects his future preference order. Consequently, the evolution of his preference
29vector depends on past experiences and chosen strategies. Since the same holds for his
counterpart, an individual cannot guess his partners preferences during early interaction
periods. Hence all players are initially unaware of the rules of the game, but understand
them better with each interaction. Furthermore, they are also able to learn new strategies
and associate outcomes by observing the interactions of their neighbours. A new mutant
action and its combination with other actions into a strategy can then spread locally to the
neighbours of the individual, who will use this strategy, if successful.
4.2. Conclusion
Since the rationality underlying the Conﬂict Analysis approach is grounded on a sequen-
tial reasoning of players, the approach is especially powerful if applied to games that are
repeated for an undeﬁned time period, which is obviously the most predominant game type
in real-world interactions. Yet, the original approach is very limited in its ability to model
and to illustrate the dynamics of such games.
This article targeted the issue by illustrating how the static solution form can be rede-
ﬁned as a time inhomogeneous Markov chain. This approach offers thus a more realistic
representation of repeated games. The last state affects the future state in two ways; directly
via its probability distribution over states (status quo) but also by its impact on the players’
preference order, allowing for endogenous preference changes. This impact can be ﬂexibly
modelled and easily adopted to a variety of repeated games. Its integration and complemen-
tation with other approaches should provide a valuable source for future research.
30A Tables
31Table 19. 2 groups - Rounded probabilities per Strategy proﬁle
From period 0 to 100 in steps of 5 periods
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
0 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.37 0.6 0.81 0.94 1.00
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.01 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.05 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.55 0.41 0.23 0.08 0.01 0
3
2Table 20. Static game - 3 groups
start-start-start
overall stability x E x x E x E x x x x x x x x
stability for A r r r r r s s r r s u r r u u
A’s preference order 7 15 31 0 2 3 1 11 8 9 10 27 25 24 26
DPs 2 0 8 11 25 27
stability forC r r r r r s s r r s u r r u u
C’s preference order 7 15 31 0 1 3 2 11 8 10 9 27 26 24 25
DPs 1 0 8 11 26 27
stability for B r u u u u u r r s s s s r u u
B’s preference order 15 7 31 11 3 27 9 10 1 2 25 26 24 8 0
DPs 15 15 15 15 15 9 10 9 10 24 24





overall stability x x E E x x x x x x x x x x x
stability for A r r r r r r r r r u u u u u u
A’s preference order 7 15 31 0 8 24 2 10 26 1 9 25 3 11 27
DPs 0 8 24 2 10 26
stability forC r r r r r r r r r u u u u u u
C’s preference order 7 15 31 0 8 24 1 9 25 2 10 26 3 11 27
DPs 0 8 24 1 9 25
stability for B r s s s u u r r s s s s r u u
B’s preference order 27 11 3 31 15 7 9 10 1 2 25 26 0 8 24
DPs 27 27 27 27 27 9 10 9 10 0 0




* no strategy DP is simultaneously sanctioned in both games
33Table 21. Individual Transition Matrices - 3 groups
Transition Matrix for A
0 1 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 15 24 25 26 27 31
0 1 α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1-α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1-α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 α α 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-α 1-α 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 α α 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-α 1-α 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 α α 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-α 1-α 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Transition Matrix forC
0 1 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 15 24 25 26 27 31
0 1 0 β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1-β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1-β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 β 0 β 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-β 0 1-β 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 β 0 β 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 β 0 β 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-β 0 1-β 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-β 0 1-β 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Transition Matrix for B
0 1 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 15 24 25 26 27 31
0 γ 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 1-γ 1-γ 0 0 0 1-γ 1-γ 0 0 0 1-γ 1-γ
24 1-γ 0 0 0 0 1-γ 0 0 0 0 1-γ 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 γ 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ
3
4Table 22. Game Transition Matrix
Final Transition Matrix for the Game - 3 groups
0 1 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 15 24 25 26 27 31
0 γ α β αβγ 0 γ 0 0 0 0 αβγ 0 0 0 0
1 0 1−α 0 (1−α)βγ 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1−α)βγ 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1−β α(1−β)γ 0 0 0 0 0 0 α(1−β)γ 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 (1−α)(1−β)γ 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1−α)(1−β)γ 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 αβ(1−γ) 0 0 αβ αβ αβ 0 0 0 0 αβ(1−γ) 0
9 0 0 0 (1−α)β(1−γ) 0 0 (1−α)β (1−α)β (1−α)β 0 0 0 0 (1−α)β(1−γ) 0
10 0 0 0 α(1−β)(1−γ) 0 0 α(1−β) α(1−β) α(1−β) 0 0 0 0 α(1−β)(1−γ) 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1−α)(1−β) (1−α)(1−β) (1−α)(1−β)γ 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 (1−α)(1−β)(1−γ) 1−γ 0 0 0 (1−α)(1−β)(1−γ) 1-γ 0 0 0 (1−α)(1−β)(1−γ) 1-γ
24 1−γ 0 0 0 0 1−γ 0 0 0 0 αβ(1−γ) αβ αβ αβγ 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1−α)β(1−γ) (1−α)β (1−α)β (1−α)βγ 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 α(1−β)(1−γ) α(1−β) α(1−β) α(1−β)γ 0
27 0 0 0 0 γ 0 0 0 0 γ (1−α)(1−β)(1−γ) (1−α)(1−β) (1−α)(1−β) (1−α)(1−β)γ 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γTable 23. Transition Probabilities for simulation - 3 groups
t 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450 475 500 525 550 575 600 625 650 675 700 725 750 775 800
0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0
1 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.04 0 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.02 0.04 0.02 0 0.06 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.1 0.02 0 0 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.02 0
9 0.02 0.04 0.02 0 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.22 0.12 0.03 0 0 0 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.03 0 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.08 0.2 0.26 0.2
10 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.02 0 0 0 0.03 0.13 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.1 0.01 0 0 0 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.1 0.02 0 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.01 0 0 0
11 0.18 0.09 0.02 0 0 0 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.1 0.03 0 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 0.14 0.27 0.3 0.2 0.07 0.01 0 0 0 0.03 0.07
15 0.7 0.59 0.46 0.33 0.2 0.09 0.02 0 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.34 0.48 0.6 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.54 0.43 0.3 0.18 0.08 0.02 0 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.37 0.49 0.59 0.65 0.68
24 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.33 0.45 0.56 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.55 0.44 0.31 0.19 0.09 0.02 0 0.03 0.11 0.23 0.35 0.48 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.53 0.41 0.29 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.01
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0B References
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